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FINANCIAL MARKETS, REGULATION AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
İzak Atiyas and Hasan Ersel1 
 
Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis seems to have generated a widespread belief that perhaps faith in 
the workings of the free markets was overblown.  Interestingly, and in contrast to many other 
financial crises that occurred in the last three decades, this time the meltdown occurred not in 
the periphery of the global economic system but right in the center where financial sector was 
supposed to be the most sophisticated.  The crisis has generated a critical revaluation of the 
dominant forms of financial sector regulation, or rather, inadequacies thereof.  Interestingly, 
while at the political sphere the dominant discourse has been towards increased liberalization 
of financial markets, there was much in the economics literature on financial markets that 
would lead one to be skeptical of too much liberalism. This paper attempts to provide a brief 
introduction to economists’ stylized approach to imperfections in the financial markets and 
the need for regulation.   
 
The perfectly competitive market model has served as a benchmark for the economic analysis 
of a wide range of economic phenomena and different market structures.  While common 
discourse seems to treat perfect competition as the predominant form of market organization, 
for most economists the perfectly competitive market model is an ideal which in real life is 
hard to find.  As once argued by the great economist P. A. Samuelson, the perfectly 
competitive market is ideal device for the efficient allocation of resources but it does not 
exist. That a perfectly competitive equilibrium exists has been theoretically proven by 
mathematical economists in the 1950s, however its existence is predicated on a number of 
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tough conditions (regarding, for example, technology, preferences, number of agents) that in 
real life are almost never satisfied. 
 
An important reason why the perfectly competitive market model plays the role of a 
benchmark is that it is “efficient”.  The notion of efficiency mostly used by economists is the 
notion of Pareto optimality, developed by the Italian political scientists, sociologist, 
statistician and economist.  This notion is defined as follows: “A situation where the welfare 
of one agent cannot be made better off without making another agent worse off is Pareto 
optimal”.  According to the “First Fundamental Welfare Theorem”, a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium is Pareto Optimal.  The implication of this theorem is that under these conditions, 
the market mechanism can attain an efficient allocation of resources without any need for 
government or other forms of collective intervention. 
 
Note that the notion of Pareto optimality cares only about efficiency: in a Pareto optimal 
economy, there is no waste, all potential gains from trade are realized.  However, Pareto 
optimality does not say anything about the distribution of resources, income or wealth among 
the agents of an economy.  Hence an economy can be Pareto optimal but highly unequal.   An 
economy where a single person commands 95 percent of the resources can be efficient in the 
sense of Pareto.  This is where the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 
comes in: It states that any Pareto efficient outcome can be supported as a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium through an appropriate distribution of initial endowments. 
 
Much of microeconomics is actually devoted to the analysis markets with “market failures”, 
that is, of environments where the assumptions of the perfectly competitive model do not 
hold.  The main forms of market failures are listed as follows: 
 
• Imperfect competition, that is, situations where agents have the ability to influence and 
manipulate market prices 
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• Externalities, or situations where the actions of agents influence not only their own 
welfare but also the welfare of others (pollution being the typical example of a 
negative externality) 
• Public goods, or goods and services where individuals cannot be excluded from the 
consumption of the good even if they do not pay for it and where an individual’s 
consumption does not reduce the amount available for the rest of the society (the 
typical example being national security, the judicial system, or, as discussed below, 
stability in financial markets) 
• Imperfect information, or environments where, for example, some agents know more 
than others about some relevant aspects of the economy than others 
 
When such market failures exist, then the market mechanism is no longer Pareto optimal and 
some form of collective intervention into the market mechanism may actually improve 
efficiency.  Hence market failures, or deviations from the basic assumptions of the perfectly 
competitive market model, provide the economic justification for government intervention, 
whether in the form of taxes, subsidies, regulations, design and establishment of markets, and 
the like.   
 
Of the various market failures enumerated above, the one that is most relevant for financial 
markets is imperfect information.  Transactions and contracts in financial markets are often 
undertaken in environments where some agents possess information that others do not have, 
and where herd behavior and panic may result in huge losses of wealth and welfare in a 
relatively short period of time.  Most contracts are written with terms and obligations that 
extend into the future about which information is simply not available.  It has been shown by 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1984) that under imperfect information it is almost always possible 
that a government, working under the same informational constraints as those affecting the 
buyers and sellers in the market, may improve the performance of the economy through 
interventions entailing taxes and subsidies.   
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Besides problems created by imperfect information, there is general agreement that financial 
markets are susceptible to instability (that is, high and unpredictable volatility in prices and 
quantities).  Some authors (such as Minsky, 1982, 2008) think that instability is inherent to 
financial markets. As discussed in more detail below, instability can be seen as an outcome of 
the very tasks that the financial sector is expected to perform, and the dynamism it exhibits 
wile performing these tasks.  Hence the purpose of policy is not necessarily to establish a 
“stable system” that would prevent the financial markets from performing these functions, but 
to prevent instability from generating adverse outcomes detrimental to social welfare.  That, 
in turn requires various forms of control mechanisms (“fly-by-wire” in aviation and 
“regulation and supervision” in financial markets.) 
 
Hence there is quite wide agreement among economists and policy makers that some sort of 
government intervention is necessary to make financial markets work in a reasonable manner.  
The controversy is about the form and degree of intervention.  It would be fair to say that the 
last two decades the degree of government regulation that is needed to maintain financial 
stability and the ability of various forms of financial institutions to move around such 
regulations through innovative financial instruments has been underestimated by policy 
makers. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses the basic 
imperfections in financial markets that make regulation necessary.  We then discuss the basic 
components of banking sector regulation in Turkey.  The paper concludes with a few 
comments on the apparent deficiencies of the global regulatory framework in the face of the 
crisis. 
The need for regulation in financial markets 
 
In most general terms, regulations can be seen as sets of rules that aim at affecting the 
behavior of economic agents so as to encourage behavior is more conducive to enhancing 
social welfare and discourage behavior that is harmful to social welfare.  Government 
regulations can take various forms.  They can be enforced ex-post, that is, after actions that 
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are subject to regulation has been implemented.  Most aspects of competition law 
enforcement is ex-post: Once firms exhibit behavior that are alleged to be anti-competitive 
enforcement of competition law ensures that such behavior is punished.  Some aspects of 
financial market regulation is also ex-post, for example rules regarding exit of insolvent 
banks.  Many other types of regulations are enforced ex-ante. Merger regulations in 
competition law, regulation of retail and wholesale tariffs in network industries, design and 
establishment of markets in areas such as wholesale trade in electricity or carbon certificates, 
taxes and subsidies for different energy fuels are examples of ex-ante regulations.  In the 
financial markets, examples of ex-ante regulations would include rules that limit risk-taking 
(such as capital adequacy ratios), and rules about disclosure. 
 
But what sorts of failures give rise to the necessity of regulation in financial markets? To 
provide an answer to this question, one should review the tasks that banks are expected to 
perform in an economy.  Indeed, why do we have banks at all? Banks are intermediaries 
between people who have financial surpluses and people who have financial deficits, in other 
words, they are intermediaries.  But why is such intermediation useful? Why do lenders do 
not lend to borrowers directly?  
 
A quick review of the literature would reveal the following:2 Banks perform a vey useful 
function in screening potential borrowers.  They specialize in assessing borrowers that are 
good risks from those that are bad risks.  In addition, to screening, the also perform a 
monitoring function; they follow borrowers and try to ensure that borrowed funds are indeed 
used for the purposes that they were borrowed for. Banks also perform a “term-
transformation” function.  They collect deposits, most of which are relatively short term in 
nature, and they makes loans which are often much longer term.  In that, they also provide a 
form of liquidity risk insurance. 
 
                                                 
 
2 See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) for a seminal theoretical treatment. Freixas and Santomero (2003) provides 
a very accessible discussion.  See Barth et. al. (2006) for an in-depth discussion of actual policies and their 
impact.  
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These are very useful functions that increase the scope and efficiency of economic life. As a 
result of banking intermediation, many investments that otherwise would not have taken place 
due to lack of finance end up being undertaken.  However, carrying out these functions is 
subject to various forms of market failures that make regulation and supervision necessary. To 
name a few: 
 
Panics and bank runs: This is a form of externality.  In normal times, most depositors are 
happy keeping their deposits in the banks and earn an interest on them. However, under 
conditions of panic, a large majority of depositors run to the bank and want to withdraw their 
deposits.  Given that banks lend longer term, this may create a liquidity crisis which may 
quickly turn into a crisis of solvency. 
 
Contagion: This is also a form of externality.  Because banks are interlinked by borrowing 
and lending relations, financial difficulties hitting a single bank may quickly jump to other 
banks, endangering the stability of the whole banking system. 
 
Imperfect/asymmetric information: Here we can really talk about two problems.  Because of 
the tasks they perform, banks are highly leveraged institutions.  For a given cost of funds, 
higher leverage creates incentives for bank owners or managers to bear excessive risks.  This 
is called “moral hazard”.  Second, depositors normally do not have information to 
differentiate between high and low quality banks.  In other industries, competition for 
customers would drive low quality firms out of the market.   This mechanism may not 
function in the banking system.  This is called “adverse selection”.  The problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection prevent a banking system from functioning efficiently unless it is 
regulated.  In addition, imperfect information may attenuate contagion effects during panics 
and bank runs. 
 
Market Power: Banking markets are often oligopolistic and increases in concentration over 
time may increase the market power of banks.  However, even when the market share of a 
single bank is not very large (for example, from the point of view of competition law) banks 
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may display unusual degree of influence on the policy making process. Most importantly, 
policy makers may perceive them to be “too big to fail”. 
 
These failures provide justifications for the various forms of regulatory interventions 
discussed below.  However, it should also be noted the mere existence of a justification for 
regulation does not necessarily mean that regulation will actually improve social welfare.  
This depends on how the regulatory authority is used and on the nature of regulatory 
intervention, including its technical-economic characteristics.  It is generally accepted that 
various conditions need to hold to ensure that regulatory authority will be used in a way that 
helps improve rather than reduce social welfare.  The first condition is independence from the 
political authority and from political competition in general.  It is generally believed that the 
best way to achieve this independence is by delegating the authority to issue and enforce 
regulations to an independent regulatory authority that has financial and administrative 
independence.  This authority would of course be bound by its founding law and a banking 
law that lays down the main rules regarding the industry, but it would be free in applying 
these rules through secondary legislation and also in its day-to-day operations.  Second, it 
would have sufficient technical capacity, which is best guaranteed by the employment of 
highly skilled staff. Third, the rules of operation of the authority itself should be designed so 
as to ensure accountability and transparency.  The authority would also need to generate 
sufficient credibility in the industry so that the market players would believe that the rules 
would be enforced fully and in an indiscriminate manner.  Finally, another important risk that 
challenges the quality of regulation is “capture” by the industry, whereby the regulated 
entities themselves have undue influence on the design and especially enforcement of 
regulatory intervention.   
 
Even when regulation is independent and not captured, it may suffer from the fact that it is not 
possible to foresee all possible future contingencies.  Especially with the rapidly improving 
information and communication technologies, financial innovation advances at a very rapid 
pace. Regulation and enforcement, by contrast, advances at a slower pace. This provides 
opportunities for financial institutions to design instruments that may make the initial 
  
 
 
 
8
regulatory constraints not binding.  Hence to be effective, regulatory and supervisory 
institutions need to perceive their tasks in a dynamic way and adapt rules to changing market 
environments.  
 
Economists often see the problem of regulation as a problem of “mechanism design”.  The 
issue is to design a set of rules, or a mechanism, that, given the nature of financial markets 
and the private objectives of the players in those markets, would provide incentives that 
would encourage players to behave in a way that is in conformity with social welfare.  This 
definition also captures the notion that the rules should “be incentive compatible”, that is, it 
should take into consideration the fact that there may be conflicts or disagreements between 
the private objectives of the players and those of the whole society (or the government 
representing them) and, would set up rewards and punishments that would align these 
objectives.  The discussion above suggests that incentive compatibility needs to be established 
at two levels: First, at the level of the market players, and second, at the level of regulators 
themselves (say, to prevent capture by the industry) 
Regulation and supervision in the Turkish financial markets3 
 
It can be said that there have been two waves of reforms in the Turkish financial markets.  In 
the first wave which took place between 1980-1989 the emphasis was on liberalization.  1980-
82 can be marked as the infancy phase of financial liberalization, in which reformers were 
concentrated on deregulating the financial system. It was naively thought that deregulation 
was sufficient to create a competitive environment in the financial markets and there were no 
serious efforts for regulation and supervision. These hopes were short lived due to emergence 
of a financial crisis in 1982.  The period following the crisis (1983-1989), the reforms were 
more evenly distributed between deregulation and laying institutional foundations for the 
smooth functioning of the financial system. The regulatory power of the monetary authorities 
was strengthened. The Banking Act of 1985 introduced provisions regarding the capital 
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structure of banks, the protection of deposits, the treatment of non-performing loans, uniform 
accounting standards and made the external auditing of banks obligatory starting in 1987.  
The capital account of the balance of payments was liberalized in 1989. 
 
The second wave of reform started in 1999, as part of a disinflation program engineered with 
the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  In June 1999, a Banking Law was passed 
(No. 4389), which, called for the establishment of a new autonomous banking agency (the 
Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency, BRSA). After some haggling over the selection 
of board members, the coalition government managed to put together a board in late July 
2000 and appointed the head of the BRSA in August.  Inevitably though, the financial crisis 
of 2001 shifted the focus of the newly born BRSA from supervision to restructuring and 
rehabilitation.   
 
An important step in the way of reforming the regulatory and supervisory framework was 
undertaken by the enactment of a new Banking Law (Law No. 5411) in 2005.  The law and 
subsequent secondary legislation issued by the BRSA introduced regulations in areas such as 
bank capital, risk management procedures, on credit and subsidiaries’ limits and loan loss 
provisioning, facilitating  mergers and acquisitions, banks’ participation, and, accounting 
standards and independent auditing.  In general, one of the main objectives of the 
restructuring in the banking system has been to enact the legal and institutional regulations for 
improvement of supervision and audit systems, changing the risk taking and risk-management 
processes and methods and enhancement of the corporate infrastructure of the banking 
system.  As a result of the measures implemented by the BRSA, the banking legislation was 
considerably aligned with international regulations, best practices and particularly the EU 
directives.  The specific measures that were taken can be discussed under the following 
headings. 
 
(i) Restrictions on Banks’ Activities. Banks were allowed to engage in financial activities 
such as securities underwriting, insurance or real estate, areas which may involve more risk 
than traditional banking activities. But governments may restrict banks from entering in these 
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businesses. The Turkish Banking Law brings the scope of the permitted banking activities in 
Turkey in line with those in the EU. EU definitions are general, the Turkish legislation, on the 
other hand, prefers to define the activities in more detail. However, in order to have a room 
for initiative for further actions, an open end was introduced by authorizing the BRSA to 
determine the range of allowed activities.  
 
(ii) Entry Restrictions and Exit Rules.  By screening bank entry, governments can try to 
increase the average quality of operating banks and thereby promote stability of the banking 
system and protect the economy from the negative effects of bank failures.  Governments may 
also protect banks from increased competition through entry restrictions on domestic and 
foreign banks, restrictions on branching and ceilings on rates charged on loans and on 
deposits.  Overseeing who operates banks is also an important method for reducing the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems created by the government safety net (see below).  
Also, licensing, transfer of ownership and bankruptcy rules are vital for pushing unfit 
companies out of the financial sector.  If banks are not licensed properly or if they cannot go 
out of business, unsound institutions are likely to emerge. This also can create a “moral 
hazard” problem.  In this area Turkey has aimed to conform to EU regulations.  Relative to 
the EU, in the Turkish case activities in which banks can engage are defined at a more 
detailed level.  However, the BRSA is also authorized to define additional activities. 
 
 
(iii) Capital Requirements.  It is widely accepted that banks can be discouraged from 
undertaking undue risks by requiring them to hold appropriate amount of capital.  Hence, 
capital requirements may ameliorate moral hazard problems associated with high leverage or 
deposit insurance (see below).  Authorities therefore, may require banks to have sufficient 
capital. Prudential rules help financial institutions to measure and manage their exposure to 
risk. In Turkey banks are required to maintain and keep 8 percent capital adequacy standard 
ratio on a consolidated (applicable for banks and their financial subsidiaries combined) and 
unconsolidated basis, in order to ensure that banks maintain an adequate amount of capital 
against losses that may result from existing and potential risks. The consolidated financial 
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reporting requirements allow quarterly verification of bank’s compliance with the 
consolidated capital adequacy requirement. When evaluating the capital adequacy ratio, banks 
are required to take capital charges for market risks such as foreign exchange risk, interest 
rate risk and securities price fluctuation risk. 
 
(iv) Supervisory Powers.  Typically, regulators focus on assessment of the quality of the 
bank’s balance sheet and loans at a point in time and determine whether the bank complies 
with capital requirements and restrictions on asset holdings. Recently, there has been a major 
shift in thinking about the bank supervision process. In the new approach, there is more 
emphasis on the soundness of a bank’s management practices with regard to controlling risk.  
An important element of prudential regulation is the assessment of and provision for non-
performing loans.  Once non-performing loans are discovered, adequate reserves to cover 
them must be established. In addition, excessive exposure to single borrowers can also cause 
difficulties for financial institutions. If exposure to one particular borrower is large and if this 
borrower becomes insolvent, a domino effect can occur, causing insolvency of the bank itself. 
 
(v) Safety Net Support.  Failure of financial institutions can occur despite adequate rules and 
effective supervision. If one bank fails, depositors may lose confidence in other banks as well. 
This can result in a chain reaction and even affect institutions that are healthy under normal 
conditions. Hence banks are fundamentally vulnerable to bank runs.  A deposit insurance 
scheme can help prevent such a chain reaction. Knowing that her deposits are insured by the 
government even if the bank fails, depositors will not feel the urge to withdraw them and this 
will help avert liquidity crises.  However, deposit insurance can also cause moral hazard 
problems. Depositors may be less likely to scrutinize their banks, and banks could take on 
excessive risks if monitoring by customers weakens. Thus, governments provide a safety net 
for the purpose of lender of last resort and as an explicit deposit insurance scheme.   
 
In Turkey, the government took drastic measures to save the economic system from collapse 
during the 1994 banking crisis. The most controversial of these was the introduction of full 
(100 percent) state guarantee to deposits. Introduction of full guarantee to deposits was 
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effective in ending bank run and the drastic shifts in deposits from private banks to state 
owned banks.  The country, after experiencing the 2001 financial crisis, removed the state 
guarantee on deposits only in 2003. According to the new scheme, all depositors and creditors 
are totally protected in the case of intervened banks, whereas only individual depositors are 
fully protected, but not commercial deposits, in the case of banks being liquidated without 
intervention. A limited savings deposit insurance system replaced the previous guarantee 
scheme as of July 5, 2004. Simultaneously, the savings deposit insurance was limited to 
TL50,000 (around EUR 28,300).  Whether limits on deposit insurance schemes is fully 
credible is a controversial issue, since in the case of a threat of a systemic bank run the 
government will have incentives to increase the coverage of the insurance scheme in order to 
prevent a total melt-down.  On the other hand, such incentives will not be present in the case 
of failures of individual banks with no systemic implications. 
 
(vi) Market Monitoring and Transparency. Market-based monitoring of banks can increase 
their stability and complement government supervision. If, for example, private rating 
agencies regularly rate banks, this provides valuable information to customers and regulators 
on their soundness. Banks then have an incentive to improve their performance to maintain 
business. Thus, regulators can require banks to obtain and publish certified audits or ratings 
from international rating firms.  International monitoring and assistance are also beneficial. 
Regulators, in order to insure that there is better information for depositors and the 
marketplace, can also require that banks adhere to certain standard accounting principles and 
disclose a wide range of information that helps the market assess the quality of a bank’s 
portfolio and the amount of the bank’s exposure to risk.  
 
According to Article 66 of the Turkish Banking Law, the parent undertakings are subject to 
limitations and standard ratios on a consolidated basis. The consolidated supervision of 
subsidiaries and jointly controlled undertakings shall be performed together with the officials 
of the BRSA and other authorities that are legally authorized for the regulation and 
supervision of institutions subject to consolidated supervision, where necessary. 
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(vii) Government Ownership.  The most complete form of government control of banks is 
outright ownership.  In Turkey, there was extensive takeover of insolvent banks by the 
government following the 2001 crisis.  Also, currently three large banks are state owned.  
Government ownership as a direct form of control has also been put on the agenda after the 
2008 crisis.   The most important problem here is the absence of any certainty about what 
rules the government will apply once it takes over a bank on a temporary basis (Turkey in 
2001, US and Europe in 2008). 
The crisis, regulation and supervision 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive discussion of the 
dynamics that led to the global crisis, and of the proposals for the overhaul of the regulatory 
system, it is still important to point out that the worldwide crisis of 2008 revealed major 
weaknesses in the set of regulations governing activities in the financial industry.  In addition, 
it also became apparent that regulators failed to enforce the existing regulations, revealing 
major problems of incentive compatibility at the level of policy makers and regulators as well.   
 
It will be useful to summarize some of the main shortcomings of the regulatory framework.  It 
became apparent that the current set of rules provided opportunities for regulatory arbitrage 
(Roubini, 2008): Large amounts of financial transactions were moved out of the banking 
system, which is regulated, to non-bank financial institutions, which are lightly regulated or 
not regulated at all.  Even though these non-bank financial institutions (or the “shadow 
banking system”) also engaged in significant term transformation and were therefore subject 
to panics and runs, they did not benefit from formal safety nets and operated with much 
higher levels of leverage relative to the banking system.  Similarly, Caprio et. al. (2009) 
discuss how the regulatory system depended heavily on risk assessments carried out by credit 
rating organizations but how the incentives ensured that they would do a poor job.  Hence the 
rules of the game offered insufficient checks on excessive risk-taking and perhaps even 
encouraged it.  
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Caprio et. al. (2009) argue, however, that the problem was not limited to the inadequacy of 
rules.  There were enforcement problems as well: “On the grounds that these innovations 
helped US firms to compete more effectively in the global marketplace, the SEC and banking 
supervisors refused to take on the political and practical challenge of establishing and 
maintaining their ability to see and to discipline these complicated and outsized risk 
exposures” (p. 7).4 
 
It also became apparent that another factor complicating the regulation of financial system 
was globalization itself.  Financial markets are possibly the most globalized among markets 
for goods and services.  Regulatory arbitrage possibilities exist not only within countries but 
across countries as well.  The absence of a supra-national authority with comprehensive 
spatial coverage creates a significant constraint on effective regulation of global players.  At 
the same time, the G-20 meetings at Pittsburgh and the IMF meetings in Istanbul in 2009 
showed that perhaps it is still too early to expect major advances towards a multi-country 
consensus let alone agreement on the issue of global regulation of financial markets. 
  
While the search for reform of financial market regulations is still going on, it is perhaps too 
early to speculate whether changes will be comprehensive enough to help governments meet 
the challenges uncovered by the recent crisis.  It seems also clear that any reform effort should 
address not only the rules themselves but also incentives of the implementing parties, 
especially regulatory authorities to actually enforce those rules.  
 
Coming back to the case of Turkey, it turned out that the Turkish financial system was not hit 
badly during the crisis.  Credit to the private sector did retrench but there were no major 
liquidity or insolvency problems within the financial system.  This apparent success has been 
largely attributed to the substantial recapitalization of the banking system following the crisis 
                                                 
 
4 They also offer some remedies to address this important problem:  One is better preparedness; in particular, 
forcing regulators to publish a well-publicized benchmark plan for crisis resolution in order to avoid strong 
temptations for large scale bail-outs during the crisis. Another is to increase transparency, in particular to force 
both regulators and especially large banks to estimate and disclose the subsidies implicit in safety-net 
mechanisms such as deposit insurance. 
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of 2001 and to the strength of the regulatory framework that was established in the 2000s.  In 
effect, the adequacy of the regulatory framework was largely due to the fact that non-bank 
financial markets in Turkey are relatively shallow and that innovative financial instruments 
that escaped regulatory constraints were not developed.  Ironically, it was the relatively 
underdeveloped nature of the financial system that rendered the regulatory regime adequate 
and effective. 
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